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Federal law enforcement agencies responded to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, with forceful initiatives directed at noncitizens
and their communities. Several of these measures raise grave civil
rights concerns. Quite apart from investigations prompted by indi-
vidualized leads, officials have singled out Arab, Muslim, and South
Asian immigrants for "voluntary" interviews,' fingerprint registration,2
arrest, and deportation, s based merely on these individuals' member-
ship in certain racial, ethnic, religious, or gender groups. Federal
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See DOJ Orders Incentives, 'Voluntary' Interviews of Aliens To Obtain Info on Terrorists, 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816, 1818 (2001) (discussing interview guidelines); Gary Fields et al.,
U.S. Draws Up List of over 5,000 Men It Wants Interviewed in Terrorism Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14,
2001, at A6 (describing planned interview program). The program was expanded in spring
2002. See New Round of Interviews Planned with Foreigners, WALL ST.J., Mar. 21, 2002, at A8 (not-
ing a second round of terrorism-related interviews). In addition to civil rights criticisms of the
interview program, law enforcement officials attacked its effectiveness. See, e.g.,Jim McGee, Ex-
FBI Offwials Criticize Tactics on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at Al (quoting a former FBI
assistant director who stated that the voluntary interview program was from "the Perry Mason
School of Law Enforcement, where you get them in there and they confess. Well, it just doesn't
work that way. It is ridiculous. You say, 'Tell me everything you know,' and they give you the
recipe to Mom's chicken soup.").
2 See MUZAFFAR CHISHTI ET AL., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL
LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNNIY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 42-45 (Migration Policy Institute
2003) (describing the National Security Entry Exit Registration System ("NSEERS") program
and its implementation). In late 2003, the government partially suspended some aspects of the
NSEERS program. See Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements from the
Special Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,578 (Dec. 2, 2003) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 264) [hereinafter Suspending the 30-day and Annual Interview Re-
quirements] (amending Department of Homeland Security regulations for registration and
monitoring of certain noncitizens).
3 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to the Commis-
sioner of the INS, the Director of the FBI, the Director of the U.S. Marshals Service and the
U.S. Attorney's Office (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Absconder Apprehension Memo] (describ-
ing the Absconder Apprehension Initiative that targets Arab and Muslim immigrants) (copy on
file with author). For an excellent overall analysis of these programs and others targeting non-
citizens since September 11, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) (arguing that these measures
may be politically easy but are constitutionally suspect).
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officials have subjected many arrestees to secret or prolonged deten-
tion, without access to counsel, witnesses, or family members, some-
times without charge or for extended periods beyond the conclusion
of deportation proceedings.4
In the nearly three years since the September 11 attacks, some of
these initiatives have waned,5 but one that may come to rank among
the most dangerous and enduring has seemingly gathered steam: the
determination of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), as well as
some members of Congress,6 to enlist state and local police in the
routine enforcement of federal immigration laws, criminal and civil
alike.
Over the past century, individual police departments have occa-
sionally participated in federal immigration enforcement,7 but the
strategy rapidly became central to the DOJ's post-September 11 "war
on terror." First, in early 2002, the media reported that the DOJ had
abandoned its long-standing view that Congress has preempted state
and local police from enforcing civil immigration laws, concluding
instead that these law enforcement officials have the "inherent au-
thority" to enforce federal immigration law,8  and senior
4 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 1
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATrACKS 37-90 (Apr. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf (describing extended detention with-
out charge or subsequent to entry of deportation order); id. at 130-41 (describing "communi-
cations blackout" and denial of detainee access to attorneys, family members, and consular
officials).
5 The government has not held a third round of "voluntary" interviews, for instance, and
the FBI and Department of Justice have reformed some of the practices that led to extended
detention of noncitizens in the first six months after the attacks. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSE BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OIG's DECEMBER 2003 REPORT ON THE ABUSE OF
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK
(Mar. 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0312/response.pdf (acknowledging
improved procedures for detention of noncitizens in some areas and noting continuing defi-
ciencies). The Justice Department also suspended some of the NSEERS registration require-
ments, while continuing others in force. See Suspending the 30-day and Annual Interview Re-
quirements, supra note 2 (outlining the suspension of the previous program).
6 In July 2003, Representative Charles Norwood (R-Ga.) introduced the Clear Law En-
forcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act ("CLEAR"), H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003), which
had more than 100 co-sponsors in the House by December 2003. A bipartisan companion was
introduced in the Senate in December 2003, Homeland Security Enhancement Act, S. 1906,
108th Cong. (2003). The House version of the CLEAR Act would, among other things, estab-
lish a new federal misdemeanor for unlawful presence-thereby instantly criminalizing ap-
proximately four million persons who have overstayed temporary visas-and condition receipt
of certain federal funds on the agreement of state and local police to enforce immigration laws.
H.R. 2671, §§ 102(a), 103.
7 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Marcus Stern & Mark Arner, Police May Gain Power To Enforce Immigration: Plan
Has Local Officers, Rights Groups on Edge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 3, 2002, at Al, available at
2002 WL 4594382 (reporting on new conclusion of U.S. DOJ Office of Legal Counsel); Cheryl
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
administration officials soon confirmed the reports.9 When asked to
release to the public this secret new policy, the DOJ refused.
Second, in late 2001, the INS Commissioner testified before Con-
gress that INS would begin entering certain categories of civil immi-
gration information into the FBI's main criminal database, the Na-
tional Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), which is accessed
millions of times each day by state or local police." Such a move
would enable the FBI to advise state and local police, via the NCIC
database, to make immigration arrests when stopping or questioning
persons they might encounter. Subsequently, the Attorney General
announced that further categories of administrative immigration in-
formation would be entered into the NCIC and disseminated to state
W. Thompson, INS Role for Police Considered; US. Eyes State, Local Help in Enforcing Immigration
Laws, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15 (same). The previous policy of the DOJ was set forth in
an Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") memorandum. Memorandum from Seth Waxman, Associ-
ate Deputy Attorney, to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California (Feb. 5, 1996),
at www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopola.htm (last visited May 6, 2004) [hereinafter 1996 OLC
Memo]. Apparently, in November 2001, the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel had reviewed and
reaffirmed the 1996 OLC memo's determination that state and local police lack authority un-
der federal law to enforce civil immigration law. See Eric Schmitt, Administration Split on Local
Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at Al (reporting that the November 2001 draft of
the revised OLC opinion "supported [the] conclusion" of the 1996 OLC memo regarding limi-
tations on local police authority to make civil immigration arrests).
9 See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-
Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002) (transcript at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm) [hereinafter Ashcroft, NSEERS Remarks] (revealing the
OLC had concluded state and local police possess "inherent authority" to enforce immigration
laws); see also Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to William Casey, Deputy Superin-
tendent, Boston Police Department (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter Casey Letter] (same) (copy on
file with author); Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G.
Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute (June 24, 2002) (same) (copy on file with author).
lo That refusal is the subject of litigation under the Freedom of Information Act. See Com-
plaint, Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Dep't of Justice, No. 03 Civ. 2559 (S.D.N.Y.), at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/safeandfree.cfm?ID=12357&c=206 (last visited May 6, 2004).
So are some of the substantive policies examined in Parts I and II, infra. See Complaint, Nat'l
Council of La Raza v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 6324 (E.D.N.Y.), at http://www.aclu.org/Files/
OpenFile.cfm?ID=14599 (last visited May 6, 2004) (challenging illegal DOJ use of federal
criminal database to cause local police to make routine immigration arrests that Congress has
prohibited police from undertaking). I serve as co-counsel for plaintiffs in both lawsuits.
n See Statement of James W. Ziglar, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy and Human Resources, (Dec. 5, 2001), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/
congress/testimonies/2001/ziglar_120501.pdf (last visited May 6, 2004) (testifying regarding
plan to enter immigration "absconder" records into NCIC); see also Unified Agenda: Statement
of Regulatory Priorities, 67 Fed. Reg. 74,158, 74,159 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter DOJ Regulatory
Priorities] ("In the AAI [Absconder Apprehension Initiative], the Service has begun reviewing
the files of absconders to enter appropriate records into the National Crime Information Cen-
ter (NCIC) database ... ."); Chris Adams, INS To Put in Federal Criminal Databases the Names of
People Ordered Deported, WALL ST.J., Dec. 6, 2001, at A22 (reporting statement of Commissioner




and local police upon inquiry.12 In December 2003, government offi-
cials announced plans to add still further categories of immigration
data to the NCIC, including student visa violators. 3 Relying on the
information in the NCIC database, local police around the nation
have begun to make immigration arrests of persons encountered in
routine traffic stops and other ordinary police-civilian encounters. 4
Finally, through various means, senior DOJ officials have encour-
aged reluctant state and local police departments to make immigra-
tion enforcement a local priority. The Attorney General has urged
police officials to make immigration arrests,15 and his senior staff have
attended meetings of state and local law enforcement officials to
press them to enforce federal immigration laws in the course of ordi-
nary policing. 
6
Together, these initiatives mark a sea change in the traditional
understanding that federal immigration laws are enforced exclusively
by federal agents, with local policing priorities set principally by local
officials. The federal effort to enlist, or even conscript,' state and lo-
cal police in routine immigration enforcement has also prompted
numerous policy criticisms. Law enforcement officials have objected
that such a program will deter crime reporting by noncitizens, is an
unfunded mandate, will divert resources from local policing
priorities, and may expose local police to liability for wrongful ar-
12 SeeAshcroft, NSEER Remarks, supra note 9, at *3 (announcing new regulations requiring
registration by many immigrants and stating, "[w]hen aliens violate these rules, we will place
their photographs, fingerprints, and information in the National Crime Information Center (or
NCIC) system").
13 Minutes from the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Advisory Policy Board
Meeting 28-29 (Dec. 3-4, 2003) (copy on file with author). The Department of Homeland Se-
curity ("DHS") subsequently retreated from its announcement that additional immigration re-
cords would be added to the NCIC. See Letter from F. Franklin Amanat, Assistant United States
Attorney, to Michael J. Wishnie and Mayra Peters-Quintero (Feb. 27, 2004) (copy on file with
author) [hereinafter Amanat Letter] (stating FBI and DHS averment that "they do not pres-
ently have the intention" to add two further categories of immigration records to the NCIC).
14 See Nina Bernstein, Crime Database Misused for Civil Issues, Suit Says, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 17,
2003, at A10 (reporting on arrests in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and other cities); see also
Cam Simpson et al., Immigration Crackdown Shatters Muslims' Lives, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2003, at
Al (reporting on arrest of Amir Shah, car wash supervisor found sleeping in car waiting for
business to open, by Schaumburg, Illinois, police officers, on basis of Shah's old deportation
order).
15 See, e.g., Casey Letter, supra note 9 (encouraging police enforcement of federal immigra-
tion law's pursuant to OLC determination that state and local police possess "inherent author-
ity" to do so).
1 See, e.g., Minutes from the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Advisory Policy
Board Meeting 45-48 (June 4-5, 2003) (noting statements made by Kris Kobach, Office of the
Attorney General, urging state and local police officials in audience to make immigration ar-
rests in course of ordinary policing activities).
17 The CLEAR Act now pending in Congress would mandate state and local police enforce-
ment of immigration laws as a condition of receipt of certain federal funds. See Criminal Alien
Removal Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003).
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rest.18  Civil rights and immigration policy organizations have con-
demned the effort as likely to increase racial profiling by state and lo-
cal police,' 9 and as undermining social unity by discouraging nonciti-
zens from accessing0the police, fire, hospital, school, and a myriad of
other local services.
In this Article, I first consider the validity and implications of the
administration's determination that state and local police possess the
"inherent authority" under federal law to make immigration arrests.
Part II examines the lawfulness of a chief FBI method adopted to en-
courage such arrests, namely the use of its NCIC database to dissemi-
nate immigration status information to state and local police. In Part
III, I consider some of the implications of state and local immigration
enforcement for racial profiling and selective enforcement.
I. VALIDITY OF LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS
In the early years of the nation, there was little federal regulation
of immigration, in large part because disagreements over slavery pre-
vented the development of national legislation.2' From nearly the
moment Congress began to develop federal immigration policies dur-
ing the Reconstruction Era, however, it has been widely understood
and accepted that the federal government possesses a plenary and
exclusive power to regulate immigration, and that the national gov-
ernment's exercise of this power has wholly ousted any state role in
regulating "entrance and abode," the classic scope of immigration
law.
22
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized these principles
over the course of more than a century, emphasizing that the power
to regulate immigration "belongs to Congress, and not to the states.,
2 3
More recently, the Supreme Court has explained that the "[p] ower to
is Craig E. Ferrell, Jr., The War on Terror's 'Absconder Initiative, 'POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2002, at 12.
19 See, e.g., Michele Waslin, Immigration Enforcement by Local Police: The Impact on the Civil
Rights of Latinos, ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2003, at 2, available at http://www.nclr.org/policy/briefs/
immig-enforce-policy_03.pdf.
20 See, e.g., CHISHTI, supra note 2, at 80.
21 See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAw 51 (1996) ("The uncoupling of migration from slavery as a result of the
Civil War made federal regulation possible .. ").
See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (2001) (analyzing exclusive nature of the
federal government's immigration powers).
23 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (invalidating state inspection and bond
requirements for arriving noncitizens); see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259,
273 (1876) (invalidating state tax and bond rules for arriving noncitizens); The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849) (invalidating state taxes on arriving immigrants).
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regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."24
In a case involving a rare state effort to engage in direct immigration
regulation, the Court easily found the state scheme preempted by the
exclusive federal power.25 The preemptive force of the federal immi-
gration power is so great that it can bar even state social or economic
legislation discriminating against immigrants.2 6 Nor may this consti-
tutional power to regulate immigration be devolved by statute or ex-
ecutive decree to state or local authorities, because the federal immi-
gration power is "incapable of transfer" and "cannot be granted
,,27away.
Beyond immigration policy making, the settled principle that im-
migration regulation is exclusively a federal concern has long guided
congressional enactments regarding state or local enforcement of fed-
eral immigration laws. Thus, although individual police officials have
occasionally directed their departments to enforce immigration
laws,28 on the whole, enforcement of the immigration statutes has
traditionally been the province of federal immigration officials. Con-
gress's extensive regulation of immigration enforcement has pre-
empted, directly or by implication, state and local arrest authority.
This is true for both the civil provisions of the immigration statutes,
governing deportation and exclusion proceedings (now jointly re-
ferred to as "removal" proceedings) ,29 and the numerous criminal
provisions of the immigration laws, such as those establishing crimi-
nal liability for entry without inspection,"t aiding or assisting an-
24 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 101 n.21 (1976) ("[Tjhe authority to control immigration is ... vested solely in the Federal
Government, rather than the States ....").
25 SeeHines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941) (holding that a state registration system
for noncitizens was preempted by federal law).
26 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (holding the state denial of student finan-
cial aid to certain visa holders was preempted); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80
(1971) (holding state welfare discrimination against legal permanent residents was preempted);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (holding a state alienage restric-
tion on commercial fishing licenses was preempted).
27 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Wishnie, supra note 22,
at 509-11 (discussing the federal government's power to regulate its borders).
28 See William F. McDonald, Changing Boundaries of Law Enforcement: State and Local
Law Enforcement, Illegal Immigration and Transnational Crime Control, Final Report 6.1-114
(1999) (unpublished manuscript for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesI/nij/grants/188877.pdf) (reviewing history of
occasional immigration enforcement by individual police departments).
29 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229-1229a (1997) (governing initiation and conduct of removal pro-
ceedings). There are also immigration provisions that establish civil fines for certain miscon-
duct. See, e.g., id. § 1324a(e) (4), (5) (imposing civil fines for knowingly hiring or employing an
unauthorized immigrant); id. § 1324b(g) (imposing civil fines for discrimination in employ-
ment based on citizenship status or national origin).
30 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1997).
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other's illegal entry,"1 or engaging in a pattern or practice of know-
ingly hiring or employing unauthorized workers.
Indeed, for many years the DOJ was of the view that state and local
police were not empowered to enforce civil immigration laws.3
Commentators endorsed the conclusion that state and local police
lacked authority to enforce civil immigration laws.34 Further, even be-
fore the 1996 amendments clarified Congress's intent to preempt
state and local immigration enforcement except as expressly pro-
vided in statute, some scholars concluded that Volice were preempted
from enforcing most criminal immigration laws.
The courts have had few occasions to address the scope of state or
local authority to enforce federal immigration laws, and have not yet
examined the question in any detail. In an early brush with these is-
sues, the Ninth Circuit in Gonzales v. City of Peoria rejected a preemp-
tion challenge to an Arizona city police policy of making arrests for
criminal violations of the immigration laws, reasoning that Congress
had not "occupied the field of criminal immigration enforcement."
3 6
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit "assume[d] that the civil provisions"
of federal immigration law implicitly preempt any state or local
31 Id. § 1327.
32 Id. § 1324a(f). Other criminal immigration provisions include penalties for willful failure
to depart after entry of a removal order, id. § 1253; willful failure to comply with immigrant reg-
istration requirements, id. § 1306(a); willful failure to disclose that one has, on behalf of any
person and for a fee or other compensation, assisted in preparing a false or fraudulent immi-
gration application, id. § 1324c(e); and importation of a noncitizen for immoral purpose, id. §
1328.
33 1996 OLC Memo, supra note 8; see also Linda Reyna Yafiez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police In-
volvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1 HISP. L.J. 9, 36 (1994) (quoting a 1978 DOJ
press release indicating that "local police should refrain from detaining 'any person not sus-
pected of a crime, solely on the ground that they may be deportable aliens'").
See, e.g., Robert S. Chapman & Robert F. Kane, Illegal Aliens and Enforcement: Present Prac-
tices and Proposed Legislation, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 127 (1975) (explaining that states are pre-
empted from enforcing civil immigration laws and lack authority to do so even if not pre-
empted); Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
939, 975-79 (1995) (same); Yafiez & Soto, supra note 33, at 39 (arguing that states are pre-
empted from enforcing civil immigration laws).
35 See Manheim, supra note 34, at 981. He noted:
Unsupervised enforcement by local police not only undermines the constitutional and
pragmatic requirements for "uniform" immigration laws, it runs the risk of complicating
the nation's diplomatic relations. "Effectuation of federal immigration policy is not a
matter that can be left to the vagaries of state arrest and detention law nor to the discre-
tion of the local police officer."
Id. (quoting People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (Reynoso,J., dissent-
ing)) (footnotes omitted); Cecilia Renn, Comment, State and Local Enforcement of the Criminal
Immigration Statutes and the Preemption Doctrine, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1002 (1987) (arguing
that "state and local arrests for criminal immigration violations are likely to thwart critical fed-
eral interests in the immigration context" and further that "immigration regulation must be
uniform").
s6 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); see also Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 199
(upholding criminal immigration arrest by local police officers).
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authority.37 A year after the Gonzales decision, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded in a brief opinion that a state trooper had the authority to
38
make an arrest for a criminal immigration violation . In the years
since 1996, when Congress clarified its scheme for local immigration
enforcement, the Tenth Circuit has adhered to the view that police
possess broad authority to enforce criminal immigration provisionss 9
albeit with dicta that seemingly recognizes an authority to enforce
civil immigration laws as well.4  By contrast, in the years after the
1996 amendments two other courts of appeals have described state
and local police authority to enforce immigration laws as "doubtful,"
"questionable,"41 and, at best, "uncertain[] .,'2
Nevertheless, in 2002, the Department of Justice concluded that
state and local police possess the "inherent authority" to enforce fed-
eral immigration laws, criminal and civil.43  In subsequent public
statements, the Attorney General, White House counsel, and other
senior government officials have confirmed that in their view state
and local police may arrest any immigration violator-civil or crimi-
nal-listed in the NCIC database.44 Although the Department of Jus-
tice has refused to disclose the scope or analysis of the OLC opinion
37 Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474-75 (emphasis added); see also Jeff Lewis, et al., Authority of State
and Local Officers To Arrest Aliens Suspected of Civil Infractions of Federal Immigration Law, 7
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 944 (2002) (arguing that Congress preempted civil arrest authority by
state and local police).
38 United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a state trooper had probable cause to make arrest for violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2)
prohibiting transportation of illegal immigrants).
s9 United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (following Vasquez-
Alvarez); United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1297-1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
arguments that 1996 amendments to federal immigration laws clarify congressional intent to
preempt state and local enforcement).
40 See, for example, Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1296, where the Tenth Circuit commented
that "state law-enforcement officers have the general authority to investigate and make arrests
for violations of federal immigration laws," without distinguishing between criminal and civil
enforcement. The language is plainly dicta, since Vasquez-Alvarez and Santana-Garcia, like the
earlier Tenth Circuit decision in Salinas-Calderon, involved criminal prosecutions only. Ques-
tions of state and local authority to enforce civil immigration provisions were not before these
courts.
41 Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1265 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003).
42 See Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 837 (3d Cir. 2002) (vacating summaryjudgment in
§ 1983 action challenging immigration arrest by New Jersey park ranger and stating "[t]here is
too much uncertainty on this record of the state of the law with respect to state rangers' author-
ity to detain immigrants... to affirm the District Court's holding of qualified immunity on that
ground").
43 Cheryl W. Thompson, INS Role for Police Considered; U.S. Eyes State, Local Help in Enforcing
Immigration Laws, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15.
44 See supranotes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing INS congressional testimony,
press releases, and DOJ encouragement of local police arresting violators of national immigra-
tion laws).
May 20041
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
that yielded this conclusion," in public speeches and congressional
testimony, officials have elaborated on the analysis underlying the
agency's new conclusion. This analysis has depended on dicta in the
Tenth Circuit opinions and, more fundamentally, on an
interpretation of the legislative scheme for state and local immigra-
tion enforcement.
46
Upon examination of this legislative scheme, however, it is evident
that Congress's extensive regulation of immigration law and en-
forcement impliedly preempts any state or local enforcement. This is
clear from the several statutory provisions enacted explicitly to permit
state and local immigration enforcement in narrowly circumscribed
areas. For instance, Congress has expressly authorized direct en-
forcement of two criminal immigration provisions. Section 274 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") prohibits the smuggling,
transporting, or harboring of illegal immigrants. 47 Subsection (c) of 8
U.S.C. § 1324, entitled "Authority to Arrest," empowers INS agents
"and all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws" to make ar-
rests for violations of § 274 of the INA.4s The plain language of this
provision makes readily apparent Congress's intent that all those au-
thorized to enforce criminal laws be empowered to make arrests for
smuggling, transporting, and harboring offenses.
The legislative history of the provision confirms its plain meaning.
When first drafted, the provision empowered criminal law enforce-
ment officers "of the United States" to arrest alleged smugglers. Con-
gress's elimination of the limiting phrase "of the United States" con-
firms its intent that all criminal law enforcement officers, federal or
otherwise, be authorized to make arrests for violations of INA § 274Y.
" See Complaint, Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 6324 (E.D.N.Y.) (seeking
disclosure, based on the Freedom of Information Act, of OLC opinion regarding scope of state
and local police enforcement authority), at http://www.aclu.org/File/OpenFilecfm?ID=14599
(last visited May 6, 2004).
46 See, e.g., Testimony of Kris W. Kobach, former Counsel to the Attorney General, before the
House Immigration Subcommittee (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/KobachlOO103.htm (arguing that state and local police possess "inherent authority"
to enforce immigration laws based principally on Tenth Circuit decisions, analysis of 8 U.S.C. §§
1252c, 135
7
(g) and legislative history).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1) (A) (i) to (iii) (2000) ("prohibiting smuggling, transporting, or har-
boring noncitizens").
48 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (emphasis added).
49 See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that section
1324(c) "expressly authorizes local police to enforce the prohibitions against transporting and
harboring certain aliens").
50 SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 82-1505, at 1361 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1360, 1361
(noting conference agreement to a House amendment striking out "of the United States" so
that "other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws, would have authority to make an
arrest for a violation of a provision of the act"); see also Chapman & Kane, supra note 34, at 145-
46 (discussing the legislative history of INA §§ 274 and 275 and concluding "[s]ince both of
these sections deal with illegal entry into the United States and since both were considered by
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A California appellate court concluded that the history of INA § 274
did not demonstrate a legislative intent that other criminal immigra-
tion provisions be enforced only by federal immigration officers,5'
and a few years later in Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit adopted the state
court's analysis. But more recently, the Ninth Circuit has acknowl-
edged that the 1996 INA amendments undermine its prior Gonzales
preemption analysis, leaving state and local arrest authority "doubt-
ful."u
3
More recently, Congress enacted amendments authorizing state
and local police to arrest a second set of immigration violators. In
1996, as part of a broad reform of immigration laws, Congress em-
powered state and local police to make arrests for violations of INA §
276, which establishes criminal penalties for illegal reentry following
deportation. 4 The 1996 measure expressly provided that "state and
local law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and detain an
individual who (1) is an alien illegally present in the United States,
and (2) has previously been convicted of a felony" and ordered de-
ported.55
Moreover, the legislative history of this new authorization demon-
strates that Congress well understands it has preempted all state and
local power to make immigration arrests except where specifically au-
thorized. Representative Doolittle offered a floor amendment that
became 8 U.S.C. § 1252c. In justifying his proposal, Doolittle de-
scribed the problem: "the Federal Government has tied the hands of
our State and local law enforcement officials, "56 given that "current
Federal law prohibits State and local law enforcement officials from
arresting and detaining criminal aliens whom they encounter[]
through their routine duties." 57  His amendment, he explained,
the same Congress, the legislators apparently intended [INA § 274] to be enforced by all en-
forcement officials and [INA § 275] to be enforced only by the INS").
51 See People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting Chapman and
Kane's analysis of legislative history).
52 Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 475 (following the Barajas analysis of legislative history of INA § 274).
53 Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1265 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003). The Gonzales court's
reasoning is further weakened by its reliance on the scarcity and simplicity of criminal immigra-
tion provisions in effect at that time, which is no longer the case today. Compare Gonzales, 722
F.2d at 472-75 (stating that in contrast to civil immigration provisions, statutes relating to "the
regulation of criminal immigration activity by aliens" are "few in number and relatively simple
in their terms"), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2000) (assessing criminal penalties for the employ-
ment of unauthorized immigrants, enacted 1986), and § 1324c(e) (assessing criminal penalties
for immigration document fraud, enacted 1996).
54 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439 (codi-
fied as 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (2000)).
55 Id. The provision further obligates state and local police to obtain confirmation from the
INS of the individual's immigration history before making the arrest. Id.
56 142 CONG. REC. H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Doolittle).
57 Id.
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would "untie the hands of those we ask to protect us," 8 at least with
respect to previously deported felons who have illegally reentered the
country. 9 The House approved Doolittle's amendment, which be-
came part of the final legislation signed into law; in so doing, the
House confirmed that without express statutory authority, state and
local police are preempted from enforcing federal immigration
laws.
Two other provisions in the INA confirm that Congress has pre-
empted any state or local police authority to make federal immigra-
tion arrests. Section 103(a) (8) of the INA confers emergency powers
on the Attorney General to authorize "any State or local law en-
forcement officer" to enforce federal immigration laws in the event
the Attorney General certifies that there exists "an actual or immi-
nent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States,
or near a land border."61 Elsewhere in the INA, Congress has estab-
lished nonemergency procedures for the authorization of state and lo-
cal jurisdictions to enforce federal immigration laws. These proce-
dures require training, execution of a "written agreement" with, and
supervision by the Attorney General." These nonemergency proce-
dures are not burdensome, and at least two jurisdictions have already
entered into precisely the sort of arrangement envisioned by Con-
gress." More importantly, these twin procedures-the emergency
58 Id.
See id. ("[L]aw enforcement officials would no longer be required to release known dan-
gerous felons back into our communities.").
The legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1252c is also recounted in United States v. Vasquez-
Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 & nn.4-5 (10th Cir. 1999). Although the Tenth Circuit did not
discern from section 1252c and its history a legislative intent to preempt state and local immi-
gration enforcement authority, the court failed to explain how its interpretation would render
section 1252c anything but surplusage, and another court of appeals questioned the Vasquez-
Alvarez analysis. See Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1266 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (not-
ing Vasquez-Alvarez but stating authority under federal law of local police officer to question or
detain noncitizen for immigration violation is "doubtful" and "questionable" unless done on
suspicion of crime of illegal reentry, per section 1252c, or pursuant to agreement under INA §
287(g)); see also Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 837 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting "uncertainty"
regarding state and local police authority to make immigration arrests).
6 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (8) (2000), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 372(3), 110 Stat. 3009.
62 INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Congress established these procedures in 1996 upon
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. See also INA §
103(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (2000) (authorizing INS Commissioner to "enter into cooperative
agreements with State and local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of assisting in the
enforcement of the immigration laws").
63 See Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Department of Justice and
State of Florida 2 (July 2002) (on file with author) ("Only participating state and local officers
who are selected, trained, authorized and supervised as set out herein have authority pursuant
to this [memorandum] to conduct the immigration-officer functions enumerated in this
[memorandum]."). Alabama has reportedly negotiated a second such agreement. See Bern-
stein, supra note 14, at A34 ("Congress has resisted involving local police officials in immigra-
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"mass influx" procedures and the ordinary "written agreement"
process-reflect a legislative determination that immigration laws
should be enforced by state and local police only pursuant to a de-
tailed congressional scheme, guaranteeing federal training, supervi-
sion, and oversight.
Were the Attorney General and OLC correct that state and local
police possess the "inherent authority" to enforce all federal
immigration laws, then the numerous statutory provisions outlined
above would be superfluous. Congress need not have bothered to au-
thorize direct state and local arrests of immigrant smugglers or felons
who had illegally reentered the country (as it did in INA § 274(c) and
8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a), respectively), nor have created emergency and
nonemergency procedures for the Attorney General to authorize
state and local immigration enforcement (as it did in INA §
103(a) (8) and § 28 7 (g)).
The Attorney General's conclusion makes little sense, and contra-
dicts not only well-settled canons of statutory inteTretation,64 but also
the specific legislative history of these provisions. ' In addition, the
DOJ's conclusion contradicts the century-old understanding that
regulating immigration is an exclusively federal function, and enforc-
ing federal immigration rules is reserved for federal officials. More
fundamentally, conscription of state and local police as immigration
agents threatens severe damage to the social fabric of communities
across the nation. Police, fire, school, and other local officials de-
pend on the cooperation of all residents for the performance of their
duties. If those same local officials are charged with enforcing immi-
gration laws as well, millions of persons across the United States will
fear to communicate or interact with them, in turn undermining
public safety, health, and the welfare of all who reside in this country.
II. ILLEGAL USE OF THE NCIC DATABASE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION LAWS
The Attorney General's campaign to encourage state and local po-
lice to incorporate immigration enforcement into their regular duties
has not been limited to reason and persuasion. Perhaps prompted by
the opposition of some state and local police, the Attorney General
directed that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and the
tion law, although a 1996 law allowed them to enter special agreements to do so with training
and supervision. Only Florida and Alabama signed up for the program.").
64 See, e.g., Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 219 (1997) (holding that a sig-
nificant conflict between a federal policy or interest and a state law must be shown before fed-
eral power can be found to displace state laws).
See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of 8 U.S.C. §
1252c and INA § 274(c)).
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FBI begin entering certain categories of civil immigration informa-
tion into the FBI's powerful NCIC database, a computer database ac-
cessed millions of times each day by state and local law enforcement
officials upon encountering a motorist, pedestrian, or other individ-
ual.6 The inevitable result of this directive has been to induce indi-
vidual police officers who submit an inquiry to the NCIC to arrest
suspected immigration violators. This use of the NCIC database to
disseminate civil immigration information is unprecedented in the
seventy-year history of the database. As it turns out, it is also
unlawful-a point powerfully demonstrated by the current effort in
Congress to amend the NCIC statute to authorize the entry and dis-
semination of immigration information.
The text of the statute establishing and governing the NCIC ap-
pears at 28 U.S.C. § 534. It enumerates several categories of informa-
tion that may be entered and disseminated via the database: "identi-
fication, criminal identification, crime, and other records,"6 records
that would assist in the "identification of any deceased individual" or
"missing person,"69 and "orders for the protection of persons from
stalking or domestic violence."70 In addition, a separate statutory pro-
vision authorizes the entry and dissemination of information regard-
ing persons with a felony conviction who have previously been de-
ported."
The categories of civil immigration that the DOJ has begun to en-
ter and disseminate through the NCIC include information regard-
ing individuals (1) with an outstanding removal order 72 and (2) who
have been determined by the DHS, pursuant to a process yet undis-
closed, to be in violation of the new fingerprint and registration re-
quirements of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
("NSEERS"). 75 Importantly, a removal order is an administrative de-
termination, not an adjudication of criminal culpability. Similarly, a
determination by DHS that a person is subject to, but not in compli-
ance with, NSEERS is merely an administrative conclusion. In
For more information on the NCIC Database, see http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ncic.htm.
67 See H.R. 2671 § 104, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (proposing an amendment of 28 U.C.S.
§ 534(a) to allow entry and dissemination of "records of violations of the immigration laws of
the United States" via the NCIC database); see also Homeland Security Enhancement Act, S.
1906, 108th Cong. (2003) (same).
28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 534(a) (2), (3).
70 Id. § 534(e) (2) (B). "[P]rotection orders" are defined to include "temporary and final
orders issued by civil or criminal courts." Id. § 534(e) (3) (B).
71 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(b) (2000).
72 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLCY 3 (3d ed. 2002)
(IIRIRA replaced both exclusion and deportation with the single word 'removal.'").
73 See Ashcroft, NSEERS Remarks, supra note 9 (describing the NSEERS program and entry
of information regarding alleged NSEERS violators into the NCIC).
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addition, in December 2003, officials from DHS announced that two
additional categories of immigration data-foreign student visa viola-
tors and persons deported with misdemeanor convictions-would be
entered into the NCIC and disseminated to local police on inquiry.4
The only statutory categories that would arguably permit entry of
this information into the NCIC are those providing for entry and
dissemination of "identification, criminal identification, crime, and
other records."75 The plain language of these terms, however, does
not authorize the entry of civil immigration information. Neither
removal orders nor determinations of NSEERS violations are a
"criminal identification" or "crime" record. Nor are these "identifica-
tion" records in the ordinary meaning of that term.76  Finally, the
category "other records," construed under ordinary canons of statu-
tory interpretation, necessarily means others similar to those previ-
ously listed.77
The case law interpreting the NCIC statute confirms the plain
meaning of its terms. In Menard v. Saxbe,75 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an arrest by the Los
Angeles Police Department of a man sleeping in a park, later classi-
fied as a "detention" under California law, was not a "criminal identi-
fication" or "crime" record within the meanings of those terms as
used in the NCIC statute. 79 Because this "detention," which itself was
not challenged as improper, was not within the statutory terms per-
mitting entry and dissemination of data via the NCIC, the court held
that the FBI was obligated to expunge Menard's arrest and detention
from the database.8s In a later decision, the court reaffirmed the va-lidity of Menard's narrow construction of 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1)."'
74 See Bernstein, supra note 14, at A10 (discussing a lawsuit challenging "the addition of civil
information about thousands of noncitizens to the National Criminal Information Center data-
base"); Dan Eggen, U.S. Considers Expanding FBIDatabase: Names of Noncriminal Deportees and Stu-
dent Visa Violators Would Be Added, 'WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A12 (discussing the possible
expansion of the FBI database to include the names of noncriminal deportees and student visa
violators).
7 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2000).
76 Indeed, the FBI's long-standing regulation defining the term "identification" record
speaks of rap sheets. 28 C.F.R. § 16.31 (1991); see also CHISHTI, supra note 2, at 84 ("The term
'identification records' [in 28 U.S.C. § 5341 does not contemplate full civil immigration data.").
77 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) (applying canon of
eusdem generis, "'[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumer-
ated by the preceding specific words'" (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1991)).
78 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
79 Id. at 1030 n. 53.
80 Id. at 1028-29.
81 See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the FBI has a duty of
reasonable care to assure the accuracy of records in the NCIC, even where those records are
provided by other law enforcement agencies and merely entered into NCIC).
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The structure of the NCIC statutory provisions confirms that Con-
gress has not authorized the entry of civil immigration information,
even where the civil information may be in some way associated with
possible criminal liability. For instance, the language of section
534(e), authorizing the entry of protection orders issued by civil
courts, demonstrates that when Congress intended for civil informa-
tion to be entered into NCIC, it said so explicitly. Violation of a civil
order of protection may involve criminal liability, 2 just as willful fail-
ure to depart the country when ordered may indicate criminal
liability.' s Yet if the terms "identification, criminal identification,
crime, or other records" allowed the entry of civil orders of protec-
tion, the violation of which may state criminal liability, then Con-
gress's enactment of section 534(e) in 1994 was superfluous.
Similarly, the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, adopted in 1996, au-
thorizes the entry of information regarding deported felons into the
NCIC. In section 1252c(a), Congress authorized state and local offi-
cials to arrest deported felons who have illegally reentered the coun-
try. In section 1252c(b), Congress directed the Attorney General to
"assure" that "information in the control of the Attorney General, in-
cluding information in the NCIC," is "made available" to "assist State
and local law enforcement officials in carrying out duties under sub-
section (a) of this section." 4 At least until the creation of the DHS in
2003,s5 information regarding the deportation of persons with felony
convictions was in the control of the Attorney General. 6 Section
1252c(b) thus provided statutory authority to the DOJ to enter in-
formation regarding deported felons into the NCIC and disseminate
it to state and local officials. This provision further demonstrates that
when Congress meant to authorize the entry of civil information, in-
deed civil immigration information, into the NCIC, it explicitly stated
as much in statutory language. Moreover, in 1996, Congress appears
to have recognized that the existing authorizations of 28 U.S.C. §
534(a)-"identification, criminal identification, crime, or other re-
cords"--did not permit entry of deported felon information into the
NCIC.8 7 Any other reading of § 534(a) would render a part of 8
U.S.C. § 1252c(b) superfluous.
82 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50-52 (McKinney 2004) (imposing criminal contempt pen-
alties for violation of civil order of protection).
93 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2000).
84 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(b) (2000).
85 See Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 2142 (2002) ("There
is established a Department of Homeland Security, as an executive department of the United
States within the meaning of title 5, United States Code.").
86 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2) (1996) (giving the Attorney General "control... of all the files
and records of the [INS]").
87 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2003).
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The legislative history of the NCIC statute also demonstrates that
the enumerated categories of information that may be entered and
disseminated via this uniquely powerful database do not authorize
the entry and dissemination of civil immigration information, such as
absconder, NSEERS, and foreign student violator information. In
1929, Attorney General Sargent wrote George Graham, Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, seeking legislative authority for the col-
lection and maintenance of criminal records.88 Graham obliged by
introducing a bill to establish a Bureau of Investigation, responsible
for "acquiring, collecting, classifying, and preserving criminal identifi-
cation records ... and the exchanging of said criminal identification re-
cords with the duly authorized officials of government agencies, of
States, cities, and penal institutions."89 In committee, Graham's bill
was expanded to authorize the collection of "criminal identification
and other records." 90
This amendment prompted an important floor debate, as Repre-
sentative Cochran objected to the increased Justice Department au-
thority to include in the database "other records," explaining, "If you
are going to confine the division solely to criminal records, then I
have no objection, but here you put in 'and other records."' 9' Gra-
ham responded by carefully distinguishing between criminal records,
which were to be collected for dissemination to state and local police,
and general investigatory information, which was not:
There are two classes of information that is gathered. One is criminal re-
cords, and another is the information that is gathered about criminals
that is not a matter of record. That they do not give out, but the criminal
records they do give out. That information is gathered for the depart-
ment itself and its agents, in order that they more effectually do their
work.92
Representative LaGuardia then offered a floor amendment to insert
the word "criminal" after "other," so that the authority to collect and
exchange records would be restricted to the collection and exchange
only of "criminal identification and other criminal records."9 Graham
agreed to LaGuardia's amendment, and the bill was enacted without
further change.94
88 Letter from Jno. G. Sargent, Attorney General, to Rep. Graham, Chair, Committee on the
Judiciary (April 2, 1928), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 2431 (1929) ("[Tlhe identification division
is in existence and operation, but.., there is no legislative authority for it other than that
which appears in the appropriation bill and it is desired, for this reason, that [authorizing legis-
lation] be enacted.").
89 Act ofJune 11, 1930, ch. 455, 46 Stat. 554 (1930) (emphasis added).
90 H.R. Rep. No. 71-85, at 1 (1929) (emphasis added).
91 72 CONG. REc. 1989 (1930) (remarks of Rep. Cochran).
92 Id. (remarks of Rep. Graham).
9s Id. (remarks of Rep. LaGuardia).
94 Act ofJune 11, 1930,'ch. 455, Pub. L. No. 71-337, 46 Stat. 554.
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The appropriations bills supplying funds for the Justice Depart-
ment's new database had an important life of their own, however.
The original 1928 appropriations bill had provided for the collection
and exchange of "criminal identification records. 9 5 The 1930 ap-
propriations bill was enacted after the House Judiciary Committee
had approved H.R. 977 (with the language, "and other records"), but
before LaGuardia's floor amendment had narrowed H.R. 977 to au-
thorize the collection and exchange of "other criminal records"; not
surprisingly, therefore, the 1930 appropriations bill tracked the then-
approved Committee language.6 In 1932, the appropriations lan-
guage became simply "identification and other records," eliminating
any mention of "crime" or "criminal, 97 and aparently remained un-
changed in appropriations bills through 1964.9
In 1966, Congress created the modem 28 U.S.C. § 534 in a statu-
tory reorganization and recodification, 99 intended to "restate, without
substantive change, the laws replaced."' '0 Confusingly, however, the
1966 statutory reorganization combined the language of the 1930
statute-"criminal identification and other criminal records"-with
the language of the most recent appropriations bill-"identification
and other records"-to yield the four categories authorized by the
modem 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1)-"identification, criminal identifica-
tion, crime, and other records." °1
The best interpretation of the effect of the 1966 recodification is
that, as the 1966 law stated, Congress made no substantive change to
the preceding law, and thus the DOJ's authorization to disseminate
records remains limited, as it was in 1930, to criminal records. This is
the interpretation of the effect of the 1966 recodification adopted by
the D.C. Circuit in Menard.0 2 In addition, subsequent legislative his-
tory confirms that the 1966 recodification did not expand the NCIC
statute to authorize dissemination of civil records. As noted above, in
1994 Congress amended section 534 to authorize the inclusion of
protection orders, including those issued by a civil court, confirming
that Congress understood that the existing NCIC categories did not
95 Act of Feb. 15, 1928, ch. 57, Pub. L. No. 70-32, 45 Stat. 64, 78.
Act of Apr. 18, 1930, ch. 184, H.R. 4899, Pub. L. No. 71-142, 46 Stat. 173, 187.
97 H.R. 9349, 72d Cong. (1st Sess. 1932).
8 See Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-527, 78 Stat. 711, 717-18 (in a section entitled
"Federal Bureau of Investigation: Salaries and Expenses" the Act allocates funds "[flor ex-
penses necessary for the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States," specifi-
cally appropriating funds for collection and exchange of "identfication and other records" (empha-
sis added)).
99 Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, sec. 4(c), 80 Stat. 616.
100 Id. at sec. 7(a), 80 Stat. at 631.
101 
Id.
102 Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1029 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (analyzing the 1930 House
floor debate and the 1966 recodification).
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embrace such records.'0 3 And in 1996, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. §
1252c, which referred to the NCIC by name and specifically author-
ized the Attorney General to disseminate information regarding pre-
viously-deported felons to state and local officials.
Finally, it is noteworthy that in December 2002, when the FBI's
own data systems advisory body, composed primarily of state and local
police officials, considered the plans to enter and disseminate
NSEERS violator records via the NCIC, the advisory committee voted
against the proposal-at least until clear legislative authority for the
initiative was identified.' When DHS officials returned to the FBI's
advisory body in December 2003 to announce its plans to add two
further categories of immigration data to the NCIC, alleged student
visa violators and deported persons with nonfelony convictions, the
advisory body again objected.'
Congress, the courts, and even the FBI's own advisory body have
acknowledged that the NCIC statute authorizes the entry and dis-
semination only of criminal records and enumerated civil records,
specifically civil orders of protection and immigration records related
to previously deported felons. Even civil records whose violation may
state criminal liability-such as orders of protection or deportation-
may be entered into the database only where Congress has specified.
Nowhere has Congress approved the blanket entry of administrative
immigration orders, such as deportation orders (other than for pre-
viously removed felons) or alleged NSEERS violators. Moreover,
members of Congress have introduced legislation to amend the NCIC
statute to allow entry of immigration information, which confirms• 106
that, as currently written, the statute does not permit the practice.
In short, the DOJ's announced policy of entering and disseminat-
ing hundreds of thousands of deportation NSEERS violator records,
and its proposal, withdrawn for now, to add records regarding alleged
student visa violators and others, is unauthorized by Congress and
contrary to law.
103 28 U.S.C. § 534(e) (2003).
104 Minutes from the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Advisory Policy Board
Meeting 69-70 (Dec. 4-5, 2002) (copy on file with author) (adopting motion against entry of
NSEERS violator data into NCIC).
105 Minutes from the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Advisory Policy Board
Meeting 28-29 (Dec. 3-4, 2003) (copy on file with author) (adopting motion against entry of
additional immigration data into NCIC).
106 H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. § 104 (2003); S. 1906, 108th Cong. § 104 (2003).
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III. THE EFFECT OF LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
LAWS ON STATE RACIAL PROFILING POLICIES
A third set of issues raised by the federal effort to induce state and
local police to enforce routine immigration laws concerns the likeli-
hood that the enforcement requested will lead police to violate state
and local laws prohibiting racial profiling. 0 7 In addition to the pros-
pect of increased unlawful profiling, the immigration enforcement
currently sought by the Department ofJustice would compel police to
engage in selective enforcement of the laws, in violation of equal pro-
tection norms in federal and state constitutions. This is most evident
in federal attempts to induce police to arrest alleged NSEERS viola-
tors. Only men of a certain age and national origin-essentially men
born in predominantly Arab or Muslim countries-were required to
comply with NSEERS call-in registration. The universe of potential
NSEERS violators is therefore overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim
men, 08 and so a request that local police arrest "NSEERS violators" is
tantamount to a request to arrest Arab and Muslim men.
Courts, however, have analyzed discriminatory immigration en-
forcement based on race or ethnicity differently from discriminatory
criminal law enforcement. A generation ago, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment applies to INS searches at locations
other than the border,' °9 and that INS agents may not stop persons
based on ethnic appearance alone."0 The Court did hold, however,
that ethnicity may be "a relevant factor" among others in satisfying
the constitutional standard for an INS stop."' More recently, the
Court has questioned whether noncitizens are even among "the peo-
ple" protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreason-
able searches and seizures."2  The Supreme Court has also deter-
107 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.4 (Deering 2000) (prohibiting racial profiling); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 24-31-309 (1988) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31.21.1-2 (2002) (same); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 2.131 (Vernon 1977) (same); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31.21.1-5 (2002)
(mandating that local police departments have written policies prohibiting racial profiling).108 ...Of the twenty-five countries whose nationals were subject to call-in registration, all but
one-North Korea-were predominantly Arab or Muslim. Of course, some persons born in
such countries are neither Arab nor Muslim, and some alleged NSEERS violators may be per-
sons from other nations who are referred for registration at the border, but there is little ques-
tion that as a factual matter nearly all alleged NSEERS violators are persons born in predomi-
nandy Arab or Muslim countries. See CHISHTI, supra note 2, at 42-45.
109 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (holding that a warrantless
search of a Mexican citizen with a valid work permit violated the Fourth Amendment despite
the fact that border patrol search occurred twenty-five miles north of the border).
110 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (permitting roving INS patrols
to stop vehicles only upon "reasonable suspicion").
I Id. at 887 (deeming "Mexican appearance" a "relevant factor").
112 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990); see also United States v.
Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003) (deeming previously deported un-
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mined that two important rules of criminal procedure do not gener-
ally apply in immigration proceedings: the exclusionary rule11 and
the prohibition on selective prosecution.1 4 Importantly, however, in
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee the Supreme Court
reserved the question whether a claim of selective prosecution may
exist in a case involving "outrageous" discrimination.
In the American legal tradition, no discrimination is more outra-
geous than that based on race or ethnicity, and there is a significant
literature condemning reliance on race or ethnicity in the domestic
enforcement of immigration laws."6 The twentieth century included
documented immigrants not among "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment who
may bring motion to suppress in criminal prosecution). For a historical rebuttal of the Verdugo-
Urquidez Court's reliance on an originalist analysis, see Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the
Right To Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667 (2003).
113 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not
generally apply in deportation proceedings).
114 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding de-
fense of selective enforcement does not generally exist in immigration proceedings).
115 525 U.S. at 491-92. In its decision holding that the exclusionary rule does not generally
apply in immigration proceedings, the Supreme Court had similarly reserved the possibility that
"egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties" might warrant suppression in
deportation cases. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51. Lower federal courts have since inter-
preted this reservation to permit suppression of evidence obtained based on INS racial or eth-
nic discrimination. See Ruckbi v. INS, 285 F.3d 120, 125 (1st Cir. 2002) (acknowledging author-
ity under Lopez-Mendoza to suppress for egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment);
Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Westover v. Reno, 202 F.3d
475, 479 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 503 (9th Cir. 1994) (suppress-
ing evidence in arrest and investigation based on Nigerian-sounding name); Gonzalez-Rivera v.
INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1443, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (supressing evidence from stop based on Latino
appearance); Arguelles-Vasquez v. INS, 786 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), vacated as
moot, 844 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
16 See COLE, supra note 3, at 2; Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and
Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Muslims and Arabs, 58 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 295 (2002) (describing race-based targeting of Arabs and Muslims in name of counterterror-
ism post-September 11); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforce-
ment, 78 WAsH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000) (arguing equal protection principles should preclude reli-
ance on race as factor in immigration enforcement); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration
Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289
(2000) (characterizing "racial classifications enacted by Congress in the immigration laws" as
"de jure racial discrimination"); Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration
Law: Citizenship and Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003) (criticizing the use of
"citizenship and race as a proxies for loyalty" in the "currect context.., of Muslim and Arab
immigrants post-September 11"); Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: Driving While Mexican and
Affirmative Action, 6 MICH.J. RACE & L. 195 (2000) (applying critical race theory to question of
relevance of race to immigration enforcement); Robert Alan Culp, Note, The Immigration and
Naturalization Service and Racially Motivated Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick Up Where the
Fourth Amendment Left Off?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1986) (arguing that reliance on race in im-
migration enforcement is inconsistent with equal protection principles and that immigration
stops should require reasonable, individualized suspicion); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note and
Comment, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV.
843 (1998) (arguing that all immigration enforcement is egregiously race-based and thus
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should apply in deportation proceedings).
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several notorious instances of discriminatory targeting of immigrants
by ethnicity or national origin, particularly during times of national
crisis, real or perceived: the registration, arrest, detention without
charge, and deportation of thousands of German immigrants during
World War I;... the Palmer Raids in the interwar years, resulting in
the arrest, detention, and deportation without charges of thousands
of alleged communists, principally Russian and East European immi-
grants; the internment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese-
Americans during World War II," 9 as well as smaller numbers of
Germans and Italians; ° and the targeting of young Iranians after the
seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979.12' The discriminatory
post-September 11 programs 2  are but the latest manifestation of this
taste for discrimination against immigrants in times of national crisis,
real or perceived.
However, the permanent involvement of state and local police in
routine immigration enforcement raises the further risk of racial pro-
filing and selective immigration enforcement beyond moments of
real or perceived national threat. In the pages that follow, I present
data regarding discrimination in routine immigration enforcement in
the years immediately preceding September 2001. This data demon-
strates that even before the September 11 attacks, INS regularly en-
gaged in racial profiling and selective enforcement based on ethnic
appearance. 2 3 In addition, the data from a previously unpublished
case study of arrests in the INS's New York District strongly suggests
that when the INS makes arrests during one important category of
immigration enforcement, worksite raids, federal agents single out
worksites for enforcement actions based on the presence of "Spanish
music" or workers of "Hispanic appearance," and target individual
Latinos-from amidst ethnically diverse workforces-for questioning,
arrest, and prosecution.
24
The evidence that even federal immigration officials, trained in
the arcania of immigration law and (presumably) the risks of im-
proper reliance on profiling, frequently resorted to stereotypes and
117 See generally Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorableJudgment of History: Deportation
Hearings, the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1431 (2003) (describing
the history of U.S. deportation and incarceration of immigrants during times of war, especially
World War II).
118 Id. at 1457-61.
119 WHAT DID THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS MEAN? 5 (Alice Yang Murray ed.,
2000).
120 See, e.g., TIMOTHYJ. HOLIAN, THE GERMAN-AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR 1189-127 (1996).
121 See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting equal protection and oth-
ers challenges to registration requirement for Iranian students).
122 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
123 INSJFK Report infra note 139.
124 See infta Part III.B.2 (analyzing the data).
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discrimination, confirms that the move to enlist or conscript state and
local police in ordinary immigration enforcement is fraught with risk.
Because the behavior of those police are frequently constrained by
state or local rules against racial profiling, the federal government's
current drive to enlist police in immigration enforcement creates a
very real prospect of expanded, and unlawful, profiling.
Section A presents data supplied by INS in response to presiden-
tial and congressional requests. Section B presents the results of a
study of INS enforcement practices in the New York District, the
product of Freedom of Information Act litigation against the INS.
A. Immigration Enforcement Generally
Enforcement of immigration laws at and away from the border has
long been a priority,15 and remains so after September 11. Previ-
ously, INS "interior enforcement" was dedicated largely to four areas:
removal of immigrants with criminal convictions, worksite enforce-
ment strategies, antifraud, and anti-smuggling operations.2 6 These
remain central priorities of DHS's post-September 11 internal en-
forcement agenda.
7
1. Interior Enforcement-National Data, 2000
Data regarding immigration enforcement operations in the year
before the September 11 attacks are contained in the 2000 Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.12  In fiscal year
2000, INS made 1,814,729 arrests of noncitizens, of which 1,676,438
(92%) were made by INS Border Patrol agents, nearly all (98%) on
the southwest border.'2 9 Of all persons arrested by the INS in 2000,
1,744,304 (96%) were from Mexico.
125 See, e.g., DOJ, INS, INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY (Mar. 29, 1999) (announcing re-
vised INS Interior Enforcement Strategy and identifying worksite enforcement as one of five
priorities), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/backgrounds/InEnfBGR2.htm (last
modified Feb. 2, 2003).
126 Id.
127 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION: INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT
("The interior enforcement strategy covers the detention and removal of criminal aliens, dis-
mantling and diminishing smuggling or trafficking of aliens, build partnerships to solve local
problems, minimize immigration benefit and document fraud and block and remove employ-
ers' access to undocumented workers."), at http://www.ice.gov/graphics/enforce/imm/
imm ie.htm (last visited May 5, 2004).
128 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (2002).
129 Id. at 237 tbl.58; id. at 242 tbl.60.
130 Id. at 240 tbl.59.
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Focusing on INS interior enforcement strategies, criminal cases
accounted for 91% of the closed cases in 2000.' In that year, INS
closed 1966 worksite cases and made 953 worksite arrests, dramati-
cally lower figures than the peak year of 1997, when INS closed 7537
worksite cases and made 17,552 worksite arrests. 32 INS also arrested
46,001 persons in 2000 classified as "smuggled aliens.",3 3  Of the
184,775 persons removed by INS in 2000, 150,068 (81%) were re-
moved to Mexico.3 4
2. Data Collection Pilot Program at John F Kennedy Airport, 2000
In June 1999, President Bill Clinton signed a memorandum enti-
tled Fairness in Law Enforcement: Collection of Data, directing federal
agencies to "collect and report statistics relating to race, ethnicity,




In response, in October 1999, the DOJ noted a range of difficulties in
securing INS compliance, chief among them that the U.S. Customs
Service operates the data systems used by INS and that INS conducts
"more than 450 million primary inspections" at ports of entry each
year, rendering data collection "impractical." 36  Nevertheless, INS
committed to implementing a field test of a data collection system at
three airports, creating certain roving patrols and fixed inspection
points, and reviewing its worksite enforcement files "to determine at
which point in the process race, ethnicity, or gender becomes known
and whether that knowledge has an impact on how cases are handled
by INS."'37 One of the three airports at which INS agreed to imple-
ment its field test was John F. Kennedy International Airport ('JFK")
in New York.'3
Although INS has apparently not made public the results, if any,
from the field tests it promised to conduct in November 1999,
131 Id. at 244 tbl.62 (calculating percentage based on 90,519 criminal investigations com-




134 Id. at 252, 254 tbl.66.
135 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1067 (June 9, 1999). The presidential memorandum spe-
cifically required each agency to: (1) develop a proposal within 120 days for a system of data
collection; (2) implement a field test of that system within 60 days of finalizing each agency's
proposal; (3) collect data "that is sufficiently detailed to permit an analysis of actions relevant to
the activities of the included law enforcement agencies by race, ethnicity, or gender"; and (4)
provide the Attorney General with a summary of the information collected. Id.
136 DOJ, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROPOSAL RESPONDING TO THE EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM
ON FAIRNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (Oct. 8, 1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/remflep.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004).
137 Id. at 4-5; see also id. at attachment 1 (detailing INS proposal).
18 Id. at 5 (proposing ports of entry for field tests).
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Congress added a provision to the F.Y. 2000 Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act directing that the INS "'conduct a pilot program
to collect data on the race, ethnicity, and nationality of persons re-
ferred to secondary inspection at J.F. Kennedy airport in New
York.'"'
39
In response to the congressional directive, and in partial compli-
ance with the presidential memorandum, INS collected data on its
operations at JFK during a six-month period in 2000 and delivered a
summary to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on September
21, 2001.14 The INS pilot program focused on inspections atJF'
14 1
In recent years, INS has conducted more than 9 million "'primary in-
spections"' annually at JFK, each done very quickly, sometimes in a
matter of seconds.' 42 Those persons whom INS agents determine may
be inadmissible or whose inspection requires additional time are re-
ferred to "secondary inspection.' 43 Of the more than 9,000,000 an-
nual primary inspections at JFK, approximately 150,000 result in a
referral for secondary inspection.'" Some number of those persons
referred to secondary inspection become the subject of adverse INS
action, such as placement in ordinary or expedited removal proceed-
* 45ings.
INS's report to the House Appropriations Subcommittee analyzes
by race and ethnicity the rate of referral (a) from primary to secon-
dary inspection and (b) from secondary inspection to adverse action.
In the sample period at JFK, INS conducted more than 5,000,000
primary inspections, referred 99,837 to secondary inspection, and
took adverse action against 2648 of those. 46 Although noting limita-
tions of its data collection and baseline figures, INS conceded to
Congress that "the data do reflect higher rates of referrals of Asians,
Blacks, and Hispanics for secondary inspection than their representa-
tion in the baseline.' 4 7 The INS data evidencing these findings is set
forth in Table 1.
139 Letter from Janis A. Sposato, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to
Rep. Wolf, Chair, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judi-
ciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file with
author) [hereinafter INSJFK Report] (quoting Fiscal Year 2000 Omnibus Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999)).
140 Id.
141 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (3) (1997) ("All aliens (including alien crewman) who are applicants
for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United
States shall be inspected by immigration officers.").
142 See INSJFK Report, supra note 139, at 1.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 1-2.
146 Id. at 6.
147 Id. at 8.
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TABLE 1






























As the data demonstrates, and INS acknowledged, before the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, Asian, Black, and Hispanic persons arriving atJFK
were substantially more likely than Whites and non-Hispanics to be
subjected to a discretionary referral to secondary inspection. Ana-
lyzed by race, the data indicates that the rate of discretionary referrals
of Blacks in the sample period was more than twice (2.16 times) that
of Whites, and Asians were referred at a rate 1.74 times that of
Whites. Analyzed by ethnicity, Hispanics were subjected to discre-
tionary referrals at a rate 1.42 times that of non-Hispanics.
Race
Asian
148 Id. at 7, 10.
149 INS collected data on the reason given by an agent for referral to secondary inspection
and omitted grounds for referral that it classified as administrative or nondiscretionary. Id. at 7.
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3. Bush Administration Data Collection
In February 2001, President Bush issued a brief memorandum to
the Attorney General directing him to examine racial profiling by
federal law enforcement agencies and the Attorney General
promptly announced a four-point plan to carry out this instruction,
including a program of data collection. I am not aware that this
data have been released to the public.
B. Interior Enforcement-INS New York District Office
52
In settlement of Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") litigation
brought against the INS District for New York, the agency released
data and documents related to its worksite raids in the thirty month
period from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 1999. 5' The first set of data
concerned the numbers of persons arrested by the INS on worksite
raids in the sample period, sorted by country of origin. The second
set of data consisted of a randomly selcted 20%'15 of the 184 closed
INS investigations files from the same period.
1. INS-NY Arrest Data
The raw data provided by INS in settlement of the UNITE v. INS
litigation is reproduced in Table 2.155
150 Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, toJohn Ashcroft, Attorney General (Feb.
28, 2001), reprinted in 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 357 (Mar. 5, 2001), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/civilrights/bush0228.htm.
151 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General News Conference (Mar. 1, 2001) (tran-
script available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/030101racialprofconf.htm).
152 Much of this data was obtained in settlement of Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile
Employees v. INS, No. 99 Civ. 1884 (S.D.N.Y.) ("UNITE v. INS"). Letter from Edward Scarvalone,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, to MichaelJ. Wishnie, Washington Square Legal Services, Inc. (June 6,
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter UNITE v. INS Letter] (providing information pursuant
to settlement stipulation). The case was litigated on behalf of UNITE by Nina Zuckerman, Nan-
ina Takla, Aramis Rios, and Diana Kasdan, all students of the Immigrant Rights Clinic of New
York University School of Law, under my supervision. Diana Kasdan and Jonathan Trutt as-
sisted in the review of the individual records produced by INS.
153 See id.; see also Susan Sachs, Files Suggest Profiling of Latinos Led to Immigration Raids, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2001, at BI (reporting on results of FOIA litigation).
154 This study included 37 closed raid files (n=37). See UNITE v. INS Letter, supra note 152.
155 Id. at enclosure B.
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TABLE 2


















Jamaica, Malaysia, and South Korea























Bangladesh, Bolivia, Guinea, Guyana, Slovak Republic, and
Ukraine
Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Grenada,
Haiti, Indonesia, Israel, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Su-
riname, Thailand, and Venezuela
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Table 3 aggregates the INS-NY arrest statistics by geographic re-
gion and compares it to baseline estimates of the undocumented
population. Highly accurate data are not available for the baseline
undocumented population in the geographic area corresponding to
the INS New York District and the sample period for the arrest data,
1997-99. For obvious reasons, there is little reliable data on un-
documented persons generally, and no data matching precisely the
geographic and temporal determinants of the INS-NY arrest data.
Nevertheless, I have used as a baseline an estimate of the country of
origin of the New York state undocumented population in 1995 con-
tained in a 1998 Urban Institute study by Jeffrey Passel and Rebecca
Clark, which is generally regarded by demographers as the most reli-
able estimate of its kind.
15 6
TABLE 3
INS-NYARRESTS BY REGION OF ORIGIN
Urban Institute INS Percentage
Percentage Percentage of of
Region of INS of All Undocumented Undocumented
Origin Arrests Arrests Population1
7  Population1 8
Europe'' 9  38 1.31 9.91 14.07
Africa' 6°  5 0.17 0.22 5.93
156 SeeJEFFREY S. PASSEL & REBECCA CLARK, IMMIGRANTS IN NEWYORK: THEIR LEGAL STATUS,
INCOMES, AND TAXES 1 (1998) (reporting "essential demographic and economic information on
legal immigrants residing in New York state").
157 PASSEL & CLARK, supra note 156, at 80 tbl.2 (presenting data entitled, "Estimated Foreign-
Born Population, by Legal Status and Country of Birth, New York: 1995").
158 Figures are for New York state. See Robert Warren, Estimates of the Undocumented Population
Residing in the United States: October 1996 (1997) (unpublished report on file with author), avail-
able at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/illegalalien/illegal.pdf. INS has
not updated its estimates of undocumented populations by state and country of origin since its
October 1996 calculations. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 2000
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 271 tbl.N (2002)
(estimating undocumented population by state and country of origin as of October 1996). Per-
centages do not total 100% because of rounding and because INS estimates for Canada (1.85%)
and "Other & Unknown" (4.07%) are not shown.
159 Including Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, France, Hungary, Czech Republic, and the
Slovak Republic. See PASSEL & CLARK, supra note 156, at 34 tbl.K (listing country groups some-
times used for immigration estimates).
160 Id. (including Congo, Senegal, Nigeria, and Guinea).
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Urban Institute INS Percentage
Percentage Percentage of of
Region of INS of All Undocumented Undocumented
Origin Arrests Arrests Population'
57  Population 158
Mexico, Cen-
tral and S. 2764 95.08 35.35 28.15
America
161
(Mexico) (1567) (53.90) (3.66) (4.07)
Caribbean162  37 1.27 24.35 26.48
Middle East161 2 0.07 0.65 3.70
South and
East Asia'64  61 2.10 26.08 15.56
The data demonstrate that in the 1997-99 sample period, INS ar-
rests in New York were overwhelmingly of immigrants from Mexico,
Central, and South America. In fact, the INS determined that more
than 95% of arrests were of people from these regions. While not all
individuals from these countries would self-identify as ethnically La-
tino, a majority of the populations in these countries are Latino.
Moreover, any discounting would likely be offset by increases reflect-
ing arrests of ethnic Latinos from other regions; for instance, one-
third of the thirty-seven INS arrests from Caribbean countries were of
citizens of the Dominican Republic, a heavily Latino country.1
6 5
The high concentration of INS arrests of presumptively Latino in-
dividuals is also disproportional to the baseline figures. The INS and
Urban Institute baseline estimates both reflect New York's ethnic di-
versity, agreeing that 65-70% of New York's undocumented popula-
tion is from regions other than Latin America. 166 Yet the arrest data
demonstrate that the INS arrested almost no one but individuals from
161 Id. (including Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname, Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, and Costa Rica).
I62 d. (including Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad/Tobago, Grenada, and the Dominican Republic).
0 Id. (including Egypt and Israel).
1&4 Id. (including South Korea, Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia,
Nepal, Indonesia, China (PRC) andJapan).
165 Id. tbl. 1.




Latin American countries during the 1997-99 sample period.67
Mexicans in particular were disproportionately subject to INS arrest;
while both INS and the Urban Institute estimate that about 4% of
New York's undocumented population is from Mexico,'68 Mexicans
alone accounted for 54% of INS arrests in the sample period.
169
By contrast, the arrest statistics from some of New York's better-
known non-Latino undocumented communities are startling: in thirty
months there were 2907 INS arrests, of which seven of those arrested
were from China (0.14%); seven were from Russia (0.24%); and thir-
teen were from Poland (0.45%).7°
2. INS-NYINVESTIGATIONS FILES
In the same thirty-month sample period, from January 1, 1997 to
June 30, 1999, the INS New York District Office reported that it
closed 184 worksite raid cases. It provided the investigation files from
a randomly selected 20% of these closed cases, or a total of thirty-
seven files. 7' In each of these cases, INS received a tip, conducted
surveillance of the worksite, and based on its surveillance, initiated a
worksite raid. Yet a review of the investigation files reveals that in
thirty-five of the thirty-seven cases (95%), INS agents relied on ex-
plicit ethnic criteria in justifying their request for authorization of a
raid. In their surveillance reports, the INS would regularly record
such factors as hearing "Spanish language" or "Spanish music," or ob-
serving "Hispanic appearance" or clothing "not typical of North
America. ,"172
Together, this data suggests that before the September 11 attacks,
INS personnel engaged in a significant amount of racial and ethnic
profiling and selective enforcement of the immigration laws. This
conclusion has several important implications for immigration law
and policy.
First, such practices are unlawful under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment, and warrant suppression of evi-
dence and termination of individual proceedings under the "egre-
gious violations" and "outrageous discrimination" exceptions
167 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
168 PASSEL & CLARK, supra note 156, at 80 tbl.2.
169 UNITE v. INS Letter, supra note 152, at enclosure B.
170 Id.
171 INS released these files in settlement of the UNITE v. !NS litigation. Id. The data in the
accompanying text were derived from an analysis of those files conducted by the author, Diana
Kasdan, andJonathan Trutt. The files are referenced in UNITE v. INS Letter. Id.
172 Id.
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recognized by the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza and American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, respectively."'73
Second, this data may compel reconsideration of these twin opin-
ions. In Lopez-Mendoza, a five-to-four decision, the Court applied a
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied in civil deportation proceedings.'74 Explicit in its
analysis was the Court's determination, in 1984, that INS training, su-
pervision, arrest regulations, and "procedure for investigating and
punishing immigration officers who commit Fourth Amendment vio-
lations"7 were together sufficient to guard against civil rights abuses,
including the ethnic profiling and discriminatory enforcement of
116concern to the Lopez-Mendoza respondents.
Yet the Lopez-Mendoza majority cautioned that "[o]ur conclusions
concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change, if there de-
veloped good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by
INS officers were widespread."7 7 The late-1990s data related above
indicate that there is just such "good reason to believe" that even
trained immigration officers routinely resort to impermissible dis-
crimination in immigration enforcement, thus compelling a re-
weighing of the costs and benefits outlined nearly twenty years ago in
Lopez-Mendoza. Moreover, in a post-September 11 world in which the
current administration has summoned state and local police un-
trained in the complexities of immigration law to the task of immi-
gration enforcement, there is strong reason to expect that Fourth
Amendment violations by police will become "widespread." Under
the logic of Lopez-Mendoza itself, the exclusionary rule may now be
appropriate in immigration proceedings.
Finally, the above data caution against the large-scale, ad hoc in-
citement to state and local police to add routine immigration en-
forcement to their already substantial duties. It suggests that even law
enforcement agents trained in immigration matters-and, by the late
1990s, more socialized to public condemnation of racial profiling
than their counterparts in the Lopez-Mendoza era-frequently resort to
stereotypes and discriminatory enforcement practices. Given the pro-
liferation of state and local ordinances barring racial and ethnic pro-
filing, the devolution of immigration enforcement threatens to
173 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
174 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1984) (applying a "balancing test to the
benefits and costs of excluding concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding").
175 Id. at 1045. The Court also noted that "the INS has developed rules restricting stop,
interrogation, and arrest practices." Id. at 1044.
176 Id. at 1045 (noting respondents' argument that "retention of the exclusionary rule is nec-
essary to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of ethnic Americans, particularly the His-
panic-Americans lawfully in this country").
177 Id. at 1050.
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expose police to civil liability for wrongful arrests and to erode the
objectives of those very ordinances. For these further reasons, the na-
tion should vigorously resist the federal government's call to en-
hanced state and local police enforcement of immigration laws.
CONCLUSION
When undocumented immigrants "are victimized by crime, they
are afraid to call the police, or seek recourse in the legal system."
17
8
This terrible reality, familiar to local police and immigrant communi-
ties alike, was proferred by President Bush as one of several justifica-
tions for his January 2004 proposal to overhaul the nation's immigra-
tion laws. 9 But several of the Bush administration's major post-
September 11 law enforcement measures have the inevitable effect of
discouraging immigrants from communicating with police and other
local officials, and therefore of denying local police the community
cooperation on which the law enforcement officials depend.
The repeated federal calls for expanded police enforcement of
routine immigration laws, and the determination of some in Con-
gress to compel such enforcement, will have enormously adverse con-
sequences for public safety and civil rights. The DOJ's conclusion
that state and local police possess the "inherent authority" under fed-
eral law to enforce all immigration laws is wrong as a matter of law,
and the administration's entry and dissemination of civil immigration
data via the FBI's NCIC database is unauthorized by statute.
Together, these measures seem likely to expose local police to liabil-
ity for wrongful arrest and in some instances for violations of state or
local anti-profiling ordinances. The wiser and lawful course is to al-
low police to concentrate their scarce resources on local policing pri-
orities and, when requested by federal authorities, on the investiga-
tion and apprehension of specific individuals actually suspected of
involvement in terrorism.
178 President George W. Bush, New Temporary Worker Program: Remarks on Immigration
Policy (Jan. 7, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/01/20040107-3.html).
179 See also id. (noting that immigrants in President's proposed temporary worker status "will
be able to talk openly to authorities, to report crimes when they are harmed, without the fear of
being deported").
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